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 Price Transmission in the Swedish Pork Chain: 





The volatility of food prices, both horizontally and vertically, have been of great 
concern to economists, policy makers, and stakeholders in the agri-food industry. 
Horizontally the issue is usually referred to as the law of one price (LOP) and 
concerns the price differentials of the same products between different regions. The 
vertical price level and variability, refers to two aspects: First, the size and volatility 
of marketing margins, i.e. the spread between producer and consumer prices. A 
second, and related, issue is the transmission of prices between the various stages in 
the food chain. It is important here to distinguish between analyses of evolution of 
margins over time and price transmission as these topics are closely related but are not 
identical. Conclusions about price transmission that are drawn from the evolution of 
marketing margins over time, but do not incorporate other information such as the 
changes in the costs of other inputs, may well be misleading. In particular of great 
interest is whether the transmission of prices is symmetric in terms of price increases 
and decreases. Furthermore, the subject of price transmission has been increasingly 
linked to the discussion about benefits from agricultural reform (Vavra and Goodwin, 
2005). A common concern of policy makers relates to the assertion that, due to 
imperfect price transmission a price reduction at the farm level is only slowly and 
incompletely transmitted through the supply chain. In contrast, price increases at the 
farm level are thought to be passed more quickly on to the final consumer. 
In this paper we focus on the analysis of vertical price transmission in pork 
prices between producers, wholesalers and consumers in Sweden in the long and in 
the short run. 
 
2.  Asymmetric Price Transmission 
 
In his survey on marketing margins in the agri-food industry, Wohlgenant 
(2001), identifies some of the key questions related to this issue: Are marketing 
margins too large? Why are margins different among products? How have margins 
changed over time? What is the incidence of marketing costs on retail prices and farm 
prices? How quickly are farm prices transmitted to the retail level and vice versa? 
What is the relationship between concentration and market power? Is increased 
concentration detrimental or beneficial to producers? (see also Vavra and Goodwin, 
2005). These questions have attracted increased attention among researchers and 
policy circles. For example, in a recent study by the European Commission (EU-COM 
2009) it was found that price formation along the food supply chain depends on 
several factors, such as the intrinsic specificities of the product (storability, 
seasonality), the market structure and organization (the degree of competition at the 
different stages, number of intermediate stages) along the supply chain as well as 
public policy schemes and legislation. These pretty much reflect most findings in this 
very extensive literature (for a recent survey see Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 
2004). 
Market power is often suggested as an explanation for asymmetric price 
transmission, where agents in the intermediates stages in the food supply chain 




both upstream towards the farmers and downstream towards the final consumers, (i.e. 
positive asymmetric price transmission). This could be through a 
oligopoly and/or oligopsony market situation, which causes price distortions and lags 
in the price adjustment process. Many studies argue that market power leads to 
positive asymmetric price transmission, which also seems logical in a pure monopoly 
context (Meyer et al 2004). A kinked demand curve is also proposed as the usual 
suspect (Scherer, 1996; Beily and Brorsen, 1989) for asymmetric price transmissions. 
If a firm believes that no competitor will match a price increase but all will match a 
price cut, a negative asymmetry will result. Otherwise if the firm conjectures that all 
firms will match an increase but none will match a price cut, positive asymmetry will 
result.  
However, the evidence concerning the effect of market power on price 
transmission asymmetry is unclear on both theoretical and empirical grounds. 
Peltzman (2000, p. 493), ascertains that price asymmetry is as characteristic of 
“competitive” as “oligopoly” market structures. In an empirical study on a broad 
såectrum of prices, Peltzman (2000) uses two proxies for market power, number of 
firms and HH index and finds conflicting results: While a small number of firms 
increases the magnitude of price transmission asymmetry, the degree of concentration 
measured by the HH has opposite effects. Weldegebriel (2004) argued that oligopoly 
or oligopsony power per se does not necessarily mean imperfect price transmission; 
showing that the functional forms of retail demand and farm input supply are key 
factors in determining the level of price transmission. Azzam (1999), has shown that 
asymmetry can occur even in a competitive environment due to intertemporal 
optimizing behavior. 
Furthermore, public policy schemes can affect the asymmetric price 
transmission. For example, Kinnucan & Forker (1987) argue that floor prices can lead 
to asymmetric price transmission if they lead wholesalers or retailers to believe that a 
reduction in farm prices will only be temporary because they will trigger government 
intervention, while an increase in farm prices is more likely to be permanent. 
Although the list of possible causes of asymmetric price transmission is not 
exhaustive, we conclude this list by one frequently sitedcited parameter, namely 
asymmetric information costs between producers, and especially wholesalers and 
retailers (Bailey & Brorsen, 1989). The effect of cost structure on asymmetric 
transmission is discussed below. 
 
3.  Long-run and Short-run Price Transmission Asymmetries: The effects of 
costs 
 
Price transmission asymmetries may vary with the length of run. One possible 
explanation is returns to scale which may vary between the short and the long run. 
Another reason might be adjustment costs that may also be very high in the short run 
and may delay price adjustments. 
A number of studies consider the structure of costs and their interaction with 
market power as causes of price transmission asymmetries. Bettendorf and Verboven 
(2000) showed that the weak transmission of coffee bean prices to consumer prices in 
the Netherlands was due to a relatively large share of costs other than the costs of 
beans while the market was relatively competitive. McCorriston, et. al. (2001) using a 
theoretical model and numerical simulations show that the interaction of economies or 
diseconomies of scale with market power can cause price transmission asymmetries, 




elasticity and they show that it depends on the interaction between market power and 
scale economies. If the cost function is characterised by increasing returns to scale, 
the influence of market power might be offset by the costs effects of scale 
enlargement and the level of price transmission elasticity may increase relative to the 
competitive case. McCorriston, et. al. (2001) also find that price transmission depends 
much on the functional form of the demand. 
Capital and technology adjustments in the long run may exhibit increasing 
returns to scale, causing differential impacts of price transmission in the long and 
short run. Although increasing returns should not be overruled in the short run 
(McCorriston, et. al., 2001) it is reasonable to expect differences in scale economies. 
Adjustment costs (often referred to as menu costs) in especially the retailing 
sector could cause some degree of price rigidity, because it is costly to change prices. 
Levy et al. (1997) and Dutta et al. (1999) provide evidence of menu costs at the retail 
level, while Beily and Brorsen (1989) consider costs of adjustment of beef packers 
vis-à-vis those of feedlots. Inventory management can also affect the price 
transmission, by creating lags in adjusting prices (Balke et al., 1998; Blinder, 1982). 
 
4.  The nature of asymmetric price transmission 
 
Asymmetric price transmission can take various forms depending on four 
elements (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005): 
I. Magnitude. How big is the response at each level due to a shock of a given size 
at another level? 
II. Speed. How fast is the adjustment process? 
III. Nature. Are positive and negative shocks at a certain marketing level exhibit 
asymmetry? 
IV. Direction. Is the shock transmitted upwards or downwards the supply chain? 




























There exist a large number of studies examining price transmission in 
agricultural commodity markets. The choice among various possible techniques 
applied in each of these studies depended on the questions asked, the data used and 
the assumptions made (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005). A review of the empirical issues 
underlying this literature can be found in Wohlgenant (2001), Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel (2004), and Frey & Manera (2007). A comprehensive review of 
estimating and testing for asymmetric price transmission is provided in Meyer and 
von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) who provide a categorization into pre- and post-
cointegration techniques. A typical pre-cointegration study involves a regression of 
price differences on lagged price differences, where the lagged differences are 
segregated according to sign, so that positive changes are allowed to have a different 
effect than negative changes. These types of studies can be traced back to Tweeten 
and Quance (1969), who use a dummy variable technique to estimate irreversible 
supply functions. Based on Tweeten and Quance, Wolffram (1971) employ a 
variable-splitting technique that explicitly includes first differences of prices in the 
equation to be estimated. A turning point in these type o studies is Houck (1979), and 
later Ward (1982). Houck (1982) modified the variable splitting technique further to 
exclude the initial observations. Ward (1982) extends Houck’s approach by including 
lags of the exogenous variables such that the delay in effects and the length of lags 
can differ depending on whether the causal price is increasing or decreasing. Boyd 
and Brorsen (1988) were the first to use lags to differentiate between the magnitude 
and the speed of transmission. 
  Although these techniques were used extensively they were not without faults. 
Von Cramon-Taubadel and Fahlbusch (1994) pointed out the potential for spurious 
regression in the case of asymmetry tests if these are estimated without regard to the 
possible non-stationarity of price series. They suggested that in the case of 
cointegration between non-stationary series, an error correction model provides a 
more appropriate specification for testing asymmetric price transmission. Tests that 
do not consider cointegration risk bring biases because if there is no cointegration 
there is no price transmission which means there cannot be any asymmetric price 
transmission either, and the results will have no economic meaning since the two 
prices have no relationship (von Cramon-Taubadel & Loy, 1996).  
The majority of studies related to asymmetric price transmission rely on the 
Johansen method or the Engle-Granger two-step technique for cointegration. These 
methods, in turn, imply a linear long-run relationship. The imposition of linear long-
run relationship might lead to misleading and spurious results, when the cointegration 
relationship, in fact, is nonlinear. In this paper we deal with this problem in a 
systematic way.  
 
6.  Model Structure of the Asymmetric ARDL Model 
 
If cointegration really exists it is possible to further analyze in what way price 
changes will be transmitted, i.e. if asymmetric price transmission is present, this is 
preferably done with an asymmetric error correction model. One aspect regarding this 
method should be highlighted. Since cointegration is based on the idea of a long run 
equilibrium relationship between two series, it will prevent the input and output prices 
from drifting apart. Because of this it is only possible to analyze asymmetry in the 




asymmetry is not possible. This is because asymmetry with respect to magnitude 
means that there is a permanent divergence between positive and negative price 
changes which in the long-run means that the series, cannot be cointegrated. Another 
disadvantage is that if there is asymmetry in the series this might confuse the standard 
tests such as the Dickey-Fuller unit root test and the Johansen test for cointegration 
(Vavra & Goodwin 2005).  
To be able to handle these problems a few methods have been put forward. One 
approach is to instead of testing for cointegration to test if asymmetric cointegration is 
present. Granger & Yoon (2002) and Schorderet (2003) were among the first to bring 
forward the idea that the cointegration relationship can be defined by the positive and 
negative components in the underlying variables, an effect that Granger & Yoon 
(2002) name hidden cointegration. To analyze asymmetric price transmission, 
assuming an asymmetric relationship means a great advantage if the relationship, de 
facto is asymmetric as this procedure incorporates possible asymmetries in the 
cointegration test which eliminates the risk of biased results. 
In the proposed method by Shin et al. (2009) the cointegration test is made in 
the regression with the upper and lower bound F-test and W-test proposed by Pesaran 
et al. (2001). This means that it is possible to avoid the problems with cointegration 
test using Johansen or Engle & Granger when asymmetries are present. Furthermore 
the method makes it possible to simultaneously analyze the long run magnitude of the 
price transmission as well as the short run dynamic adjustment process. This may 
allow us to disentangle the effects of market power from those of scale and 
adjustment costs.  As we have discussed previously, price transmission can arise 
because of other reasons than market power such as scale economies and adjustment 
costs. Price transmission because of scale and adjustment costs will more likely occur 
in the short run (Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004:590) so if one can conclude 
that the asymmetries also tend to last in the long run there is a greater probability that 
this asymmetry has arisen because of market power. 
 
6.1  Asymmetric non-linear auto regressive distributed lag model 
 
The linear ARDL approach is an efficient technique for determining 
cointegrating relationships in small samples and also has the additional advantage that 
it can be applied irrespective of the regressors’ order of integration (Pesaran and Shin, 
1998); that is, it can be applied regardless of the stationary properties of the variables 
in the sample, thus allowing for statistical inferences on long-run estimates which are 
not possible under alternative cointegration techniques. Hence, we are not concerned 
whether the applied series are I(0) or I(1).  
The asymmetric nonlinear ARDL model (NARDL) applied in this paper is a 
relatively new technique for detecting both long- and short-run asymmetries between 
economic variables. The model was advanced by Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo 
(2009) and is an asymmetric expansion of the above mentioned linear ARDL model. 
Following Pesaran and Shin (1998), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001), Schorderet 
(2004) and Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo (2009), consider the asymmetric 
cointegrating regression: 
ttt t yxx u ββ
++ −− =++ ,             ( 1 )  
where β
+  and β
−  are the associated long-run parameters while,  t x is a k×1 vector of 
regressors decomposed as: 
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By associating (3.1) to the ARDL(c, d) case we obtain the following asymmetric error 
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where  a θ β
++ =− ,  a θ β
−− =− ,  2 ii ι π βϕ ψ
++ =− + ,  2 ii ι π βϕ ψ
−+ =− +  for  1,..., ic = . 
 
The Asymmetric ARDL Cointegration approach follows  three steps; namely, 
step one concerns the estimation of the regressors  t x which are decomposed into 
t x
+and  t x
−, and can be estimated simply by standard OLS. Step two is the 




(unrestricted error correction mechanism regression), by means of a modified F-test 
using the bounds-testing procedure advanced by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) and 
Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo (2009), which refers to the joint null, 
0 αθ θ
+− ===  in (3.4). Step three, refers to the testing by means of the Wald test 
for: (i) long-run symmetry where θ θθ
+ − = = , and (ii) short-run symmetry in which 
ii π π
+− =  for all  1,..., ic = . Finally, the asymmetric ARDL model (3.4) could be used 
to obtain the asymmetric dynamic multiplier effects of a unit change in  t x
+ and  t x
− on 
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  Figure 2 shows the pork price evolution for the three levels in the market chain 
in Sweden. As seen from the figure there has been great variability in all prices. 
Furthermore, all prices seem to follow a common trend which talks in favor for a 





















Figure 2. Monthly pork price indices of retail, wholesale, and producer in logs 
  Test for unit root is done using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron test with optimal lag length chosen from Akaike and Schwarz Bayesian 
information criteria. In Table 1 it is shown that all series are non stationary in levels 
whilst they are all stationary after differentiation. By that it is possible to say that all 
pork prices are I(1). With this in mind the analysis goes forward with cointegration 
test. This is done with Engle-Granger’s two step method and Johansen. As seen from 
Table 1 the results are very ambivalent. A clear result of cointegration is only present 
in the relationship between producer and wholesale prices. The other two give mixed 
results. But, as mentioned above, since our data probably is characterized by non-
linearity and asymmetric attributes, the results should be construed with caution. 
  Since the diagram talk in favor for a relationship between the three series this 
adduces for the ARDL method with asymmetric cointegration. This method is applied 
to all series and in each direction to control for the causality.  
 
Table 1. Estimation Results 
Pork
Variable coefficient stderror coefficient stderror coefficient stderror
constant 0.69516*** 0.17728 0.52766*** 0.14061 0.61026*** 0.14306
trend 0.0009601*** 0.0003181 — — 0.0005843** 0.0002529
Lyt-1 -0.15625*** 0.039375 -0.11321*** 0.0303 -0.13851*** 0.031986
Lx
+
t-1 0.037825* 0.020929 0.058744*** 0.02209 0.044488*** 0.01511
Lx
-
t-1 0.12834*** 0.040065 0.048162** 0.020188 0.067188*** 0.019558
Δyt-1 -0.10431 0.071064 0.015481 0.085757 -0.12099* 0.067084
Δyt-2 —— —— — —
Δyt-3 —— —— — —
Δx
+
t 0.37573*** 0.077077 0.30291*** 0.051671 0.15032*** 0.040972
Δx
+
t-1 —— 0.18267*** 0.065277 0.11536** 0.047307
Δx
+
t-2 —— —— — —
Δx
+
t-3 —— —— — —
Δx
-
t —— —— — —
Δx
-
t-1 — — -0.080286 0.050853
Δx
-
t-2 0.20425** 0.092045 0.17893*** 0.059572 — —
Δx
-
t-3 —— 0.083581 0.062282 0.034084 0.043176
R
2 0.48071 0.62484 0.46981







FPSS —— — — 6.4679**
W PSS 19.5047** 15.6648**
W LS 7.5514 [0.006] 13.1255 [0.000] 2.21 [0.137]
W KS 2.0857 [0.149] 4.5097 [0.034] 11.3984 [0.001]
0.4204696***
R = W W = P R = P
 
 
  The PSS F-test results in cointegration for all downstream relationships but for 




within the pork sector. Thus, changes in producer prices will affect the wholesale 
price as well as the retail price, as well as changes in the wholesale price will affect 
the retail price.  
 








Producer-->Wholesale A/A 0.519/0.425 +/+
Producer-->Retail A/S 0.42 +/S




  The wholesale level showed positive asymmetric response to changes in the 
producer price, both in the short and long run. Where this asymmetry come from is 
hard to say without any further analysis on the fundamental functioning of this 
market. The wholesale sector does probably possess some market power against the 
producers. Since the asymmetry is positive in its nature it is easy at hand to say that is 
asymmetry is a result of greedy wholesaler who take advantage of price increases on 
the producer level to quietly raise their prices more than adequate. But, on the other 
hand, the competition level within this sector is fairly high in Sweden. In the short run 
the asymmetry can be a result of adjustment costs. Because of biological reasons there 
is a substantial sluggishness in the adaption to changes in demand within the pork 
sector. Under these circumstances it is possible that the wholesale sector raises their 
prices to avoid an empty stock (Baily & Brorsen 1989). In the long run these 
biological lags and adjustment costs should play a smaller part. Thus can the long run 
asymmetry, to a greater extend, be addresses to misuse of market power in the 
wholesale level. Especially since the asymmetry is of positive nature.   
  The Wald test is unable to reject long-run symmetry between producer and 
retail price changes. So, in the long run price changes will converge towards a 
symmetric long run relationship between these two price levels. In the short-run 
however the negative price changes were insignificant, indicating a short-run 
asymmetric price transmission. This means that in the short run only price increases 
are transmitted. Because of the complete lack of price reduction in the short run it is 
possible to say that the market power might play a significant part in explaining the 
short run asymmetry here. 
  The price linkage between retail and wholesale showed a symmetric 
relationship in the short run but an asymmetric price transmission in the long run. 
This is a strange result which has not been showed that much in the previous 
literature. One possible explanation is the biological lags that have been mentioned 
above. Since the farmer’s supply function is completely inelastic in the short run it 
will take a few periods before they can adapt to a different demand. If the price 
change does not have any effect until long run this could explain the results. However 
the wholesale sector should only be partially effected by this phenomenon and also, 
the demand factor should not have that big of an impact since it is downstream 
causality at hand. With this said it can be concluded that more research should 
probably be pointed towards this phenomenon.  
  Furthermore, the asymmetry between the retail and wholesale sectors is of 
negative nature, i.e. the retail level will adjust more extensive and faster on price 




0.892 for positive and negative price changes respectively. So, when the wholesale 
price increases (decreases) with 10 percent the retail price will increase (decrease) 
with 2.15 (8.92) percent. An action that is clearly good for the consumers. The 
Swedish retail sector is characterized by a few dominating firms and high 
concentration levels (Konkurrensverket 2008). From these facts it is possible to say 
that the shown asymmetry is a result of oligopoly competition where the retail sector 
avoids increasing its prices to maintain, or enlarge, their market share (e.g. Ward 
1982). However, because of the short run symmetry and the long run asymmetry there 
might also be something else involved. 
 
8. Concluding  remarks 
 
  In this study we have investigated the price linkage between different levels 
within the food market chain in the Swedish pork industry. The combination of 
asymmetric cointegration and a dynamic ARDL model have made it possible to test 
for both long-run and short run asymmetries. The establishment of asymmetries in the 
long run can to large extend can be ascribed to market power.  
  Although the results are ambiguous showing both symmetric and asymmetric 
results in some of the price series, they point towards further investigation and 
analysis. 






Azzam, A. M. (1999). Asymmetry and rigidity in farm-retail price transmission. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(3):525-533. 
Bailey, D. and Brorsen, B. W. (1989). Price asymmetry in spatial fed cattle markets. 
Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 14(2):246-252. 
Balke, N. S., Brown, S. P. A., and Yucel, M. (1998). Crude oil and gasoline prices: an 
asymmetric relationship? Economic and Financial Policy Review(Q 1):2-11. 
Bettendorf, L. and Verboven, F. (2000). Incomplete transmission of coffee bean 
prices: evidence from the Netherlands. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics 27(1):1. 
Blinder, A. S. (1982). Inventories and sticky prices: More on the microfoundations of 
macroeconomics. The American Economic Review 72(3):334-348. 
Boyd, M. S. and Brorsen, B. W. (1988). Price asymmetry in the US pork marketing 
channel. North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics 10(1):103. 
Cramon-Taubadel, S. and Loy, J. P. (1996). Price asymmetry in the international 
wheat market: Comment. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 
44(3):311-317. 
Cramon-Taubadel, S. V. (1998). Estimating asymmetric price transmission with the 
error correction representation: An application to the German pork market. 
European Review of Agricultural Economics 25(1):1. 
Dutta, S., Bergen, M., Levy, D., and Venable, R. (1999). Menu costs, posted prices, 
and multiproduct retailers. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking:683-703. 
EU-COM. (2009). Analysis of price transmission along the food supply chain in the 
EU. European Commision. COM(2009)591. 2009. Luxemburg.  
Frey, G. and Manera, M. (2007). Econometric models of asymmetric price 
transmission. Journal of Economic Surveys 21(2):349. 
Granger, C. W. and Yoon, G. (2002). Hidden Cointegration. San Diego, California, 
2002-02. University of California. 
Houck, J. P. (1977). An approach to specifying and estimating nonreversible 
functions. American Journal of Agricultural Economics:570-572. 
Kinnucan, H. W. and Forker, O. D. (1987). Asymmetry in farm-retail price 
transmission for major dairy products. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 69(2):285-292. 
Konkurrensverket. (2008). Konkurrensen i Sverige 2007. Stockholm: 
Konkurrensverkets rapportserie 2007:4. 
Levy, D., Bergen, M., Dutta, S., and Venable, R. (1997). The Magnitude of Menu 
Costs: Direct Evidence from Large US Supermarket Chains*. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 112(3):791-825. 
McCorriston, S., Morgan, C. W., and Rayner, A. J. (1998). Processing technology, 
market power and price transmission. Journal of Agricultural Economics 
49(2):185-201. 
McCorriston, S., Morgan, C., and Rayner, A. (2000). Price transmission The 
interaction between firm behaviour and returns to scale. 
Meyer, J. and Cramon-Taubadel, S. (2004). Asymmetric price transmission: A survey. 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 55(3):581-611. 
Peltzman, S. (2000). Prices rise faster than they fall. Journal of Political Economy 
108(3):466-502. 
Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y., and Smith, R. J. (2001). Bounds testing approaches to the 




Scherer, F. M. and Ross, D. (1990). Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance. Boston: Oughton Mifflin Company. 
Schorderet, Y. (2003). Asymmetric cointegration. Universite de Geneve, Faculte des 
sciences eqconomiques et sociales, Departement d'econometrie. Working Paper. 
Shin, Y., Yu, B., and Greenwood-Nimmo. (2009). M. Modelling asymmetric 
cointegration and dynamic multipliers in an ARDL framework'. Working Paper 
Tweeten, L. G. and Quance, C. L. (1969). Positivistic measures of aggregate supply 
elasticities: some new approaches. The American Economic Review 59(2):175-
183. 
Vavra, P. and Goodwin, B. K. (2005). Analysis of price transmission along the food 
chain. OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers. 
von Cramon-Taubadel, S. and Fahlbusch, S. (1994). Identifying asymmetric price 
transmission with Error Correction Models. Working Paper 
Ward, R. W. (1982). Asymmetry in retail, wholesale, and shipping point pricing for 
fresh vegetables. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64(2):205-212. 
Weldegebriel, H. T. (2004). Imperfect Price Transmission: Is Market Power Really to 
Blame? Journal of Agricultural Economics 55(1):101-114. 
Wohlgenant, M. K. (2001). Marketing margins: empirical analysis. Handbook of 
Agricultural Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V, 933-970. 
Wolffram, R. (1971). Positivistic Measures of Aggregate Supply Elasticities: Some 
New Approaches: Some Critical Notes. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 53(2):356-359. 
 